Archive for the ‘Law’ Category
aristocrat, Epistemology, Friedrich Nietzsche, genealogy, knowledge, morality, On the Genealogy of Morals, philosophy, Precis, ressentiment, slave
In Art, Artist, Arts & Letters, Ethics, Humanities, Law, Philosophy, Rhetoric, Western Civilization, Writing on September 1, 2011 at 11:44 pm
We remain unknown to ourselves, we seekers after knowledge, even to ourselves: and with good reason. We have never sought after ourselves—so how should we one day find ourselves? It has rightly been said that: ‘Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also’; our treasure is to be found in the beehives of knowledge. As spiritual bees from birth, this is our eternal destination, our hearts are set on one thing only—‘bringing something home.’
— Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche employs an aphorism to open the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals (GM). That approach seems fitting for this critical précis, the aphoristic epigram to which quotes none other than Nietzsche himself.
The opening declarative here—“We remain unknown to ourselves”—signals the ancient Greek imperative: “Know thyself.” That Nietzsche converts the imperative to a declarative is suggestive. The imperative expresses a command: the emphatic utterance of an authoritative demand (“do this”). The declarative is a descriptive assertion: the positive utterance of fact or opinion. The imperative, if issued by the right person and not meant as merely advisory, presupposes the power to enforce or induce the substance of the command. A speaker that commands another to know himself assumes that the other will act, can act, or ought to act in accordance with what he, the speaker, orders. The speaker of a declarative statement, on the other hand, conveys information; the transmission of data from the speaker to the listener does not necessarily signify a desire that the listener act, or refrain from acting, in accordance with the data or the speaker’s wishes.
Nietzsche uses the declarative to describe our epistemic state or to posit an idea about our epistemic state. His articulation necessarily undermines the idea that we already have answered the call to know ourselves. Either we have ignored the command to know ourselves (“We have never sought after ourselves”), or we have failed to comply with it—or both. To the extent that Western philosophy could, at Nietzsche’s moment, be reduced to these two words—“know thyself”—Western philosophy had, if we believe Nietzsche’s declaration, failed or decayed. What Nietzsche seeks to posit, in more assertive or, one might say, more declarative terms, is a radical rewriting and reinterpretation of knowledge itself. To know ourselves, we must know what we know and how we know it, or know what we think we know and how to overcome it. We have blurred the distinction between knowledge and morals; we have internalized weak epistemic truth claims across time; a genealogy of morals is necessary to trace and thereby illuminate our understanding of ourselves. Read the rest of this entry »
Blind, Blindness, Borges, Calvin Coolidge, Coleridge, Destin, Emerson, Irving, judge, justice, Keats, Lincoln, Literature, Michael Stone, Opelika, Poe, poetry, Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Writing
In Art, Arts & Letters, Communication, Creative Writing, Emerson, Essays, Humanities, Law, Literature, Poetry, Shakespeare, Teaching on August 28, 2011 at 1:30 pm
I wrote the following piece about three weeks ago, while I was vacationing in Destin, Florida, with my family.
If we expect others to rely on our fairness and justice we must show that we rely on their fairness and justice.
—Calvin Coolidge
My wife and I are on vacation in Florida. Yesterday morning, over a cup of coffee and a doughnut, sitting on the balcony and reading the newspaper amid sounds of seagulls and the grating roll of morning waves, I noted that one Michael Stone—a blind man, XTERRA champion, and 10-time Ironman triathlete who recently published a book, Eye Envy—will speak at the University of North Florida on August 13. I haven’t read Stone’s book, but it’s apparently a resource not only for those suffering from vision-loss any degenerative disease.
Stone began to lose his sight in 2004. His blindness is a result of a rare disease called cone-rod dystrophy. Despite his handicap, he has accomplished amazing things, but not without the help of others. During races, he relies on guides, who shout directions and warnings to him.
I’ll never understand why God makes some people handicapped and others not, why some must rely on others, and some must be relied on. Someday and for a time, everyone relies on someone or something and is relied on by someone or something. Read the rest of this entry »
Action-Based Jurisprudence, Austrian Economics, Ethics, jurisprudence, Konrad Graf, law, Libertarian Papers, Praxeology, Prometheus Unbound: A Libertarian Review of Fiction and Literature, Stephan Kinsella
In Austrian Economics, Humane Economy, Humanities, Jurisprudence, Law, Liberalism, Libertarianism, News Release, Politics on August 14, 2011 at 7:54 pm
Konrad Graf, who, with me, contributes to Prometheus Unbound: A Libertarian Review of Fiction and Literature, has published the following essay in Libertarian Papers: “Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice.” Here is the abstract to the piece:
Action-based legal theory is a discrete branch of praxeology and the basis of an emerging school of jurisprudence related to, but distinct from, natural law. Legal theory and economic theory share content that is part of praxeology itself: the action axiom, the a priori of argumentation, universalizable property theory, and counterfactual-deductive methodology. Praxeological property-norm justification is separate from the strictly ethical “ought” question of selecting ends in an action context. Examples of action-based jurisprudence are found in existing “Austro-libertarian” literature. Legal theory and legal practice must remain distinct and work closely together if justice is to be found in real cases. Legal theorizing was shaped in religious ethical contexts, which contributed to confused field boundaries between law and ethics. The carrot and stick influence of rulers on theorists has distorted conventional economics and jurisprudence in particular directions over the course of centuries. An action-based approach is relatively immune to such sources of distortion in its methods and conclusions, but has tended historically to be marginalized from conventional institutions for this same reason.
This piece is striking for a number of reasons, not least of which is the way it came about. As the Mises Economics Blog explains,
This is an interesting, provocative analysis of libertarian theory that highlights the strength of the Mises Institute’s approach and model of openness. First, this piece was inspired by the author’s participating in a Mises Academy course.
Second, the author is not a professional scholar or academic. In days past such authors–who are often the source of new ideas–would be shut out by credentialism and the iron grip certain institutions had over the few avenues of publication. The open model of the Mises Institute’s Libertarian Papers–rigorously double-blind peer-reviewed but open to private scholars as well as academics, as its focus is on ideas–breaks free of this hidebound model.
Third, the article is 75 pages long, much longer than many journals can accept. But this is no problem for the Libertarian Papers model as it is online, not centered on paper.
To sum up, this provocative piece was stimulated by the Mises Institute’s being on the forefront of technology (Mises Academy), not to mention the gargantuan volume of free, online resource such authors are able to draw on (Mises.org), and then was offered a publishing platform (Libertarian Papers) despite its length and the author’s private, “non-credentialed” status. In my view, this is all to the good and a testament to the heroic work done by the Mises Institute.
Libertarian Papers is edited by Stephan Kinsella. Visit Kinsella’s website here. Visit Mises Academy (which inspired Graf’s article) by clicking here.
Anamnesis, First Things, John Finnis, LYCEUM, Modern Age, Natural Law, Peter Haworth, R. J. Snell, Robert P George, Thaddeus J. Kozinski, The Good Society, The Mises Review, The New Natural Law Theory
In Arts & Letters, Conservatism, Essays, History, Humanities, Jurisprudence, Law, Liberalism, News and Current Events, News Release, Politics, Religion, Rhetoric, Western Civilization on August 12, 2011 at 4:19 pm
Over at the web-essay section of Anamnesis: A Journal for the Study of Tradition, Place, and ‘Things Divine,’ Professors R. J. Snell and Thaddeus J. Kozinski have weighed in on debates over the New Natural Law theory.
Here is Snell’s thesis:
Despite differences in particular religious commitments, a significant number of theists share reservations about the natural law. Natural law theory overlooks the Fall, arrogates the domain of revelation, attempts obligation without divine command, and treats God in the generic and thus in terms alien to the believer—just some of the many objections.In this short essay I offer a broad defense against these charges, particularly claiming that understanding natural law through human subjectivity recognizes how humans actually know and so consequently preserves the uniqueness and transcendence of God.
Appealing to authorities within the religious tradition may go some distance in answering objections, for theology and sacred text tends to vindicate the natural lawyers, especially if the religion has a doctrine of creation. But the charges may have particular traction against the so-called New Natural Law Theory (NNL), with its first-person perspective. As Christopher O. Tollefsen explains, the NNL takes seriously “considerations concerning the nature of human action,” particularly intentions as “agent-centered, or first-personal … from the point of view of the agent as seeking some good.” It is, he continues, “only by adopting the perspective of the acting person that an agent’s action can be best understood.”
Here is Kozinski’s thesis:
I commend R.J. Snell for his excellent essay “God, Religion, and the New Natural Law.” His thesis: “understanding natural law through human subjectivity recognizes how humans actually know and so consequently preserves the uniqueness and transcendence of God” is defended rigorously, and is, to my mind, true. However, in allying his argument with those of the New Natural Law school, I think he does himself a disservice.There is nothing in his thesis in terms of data, premises, argumentation, and conclusions that requires such an alliance, for everything he claims about the indispensable role and even primacy of subjectivity, experience, understanding, and judgment in ethical inquiry and practice rings true on its own and is clearly in accordance with the philosophia perennis in general and Thomistic ethical philosophy in particular. Whereas, the major claim of the New Natural Theory, that is, the adequacy of practical reason alone to ground and explain ethical theory and practice, does not ring true and is in, at least prima facie, contradiction with traditional Catholic and Thomistic moral philosophy and theology.
Though I agree with Dr. Snell that the modern and postmodern “turn to the subject” is the most appropriate beginning to inquiry about the natural law, and maybe the most effective motivation for obeying it, in our present public milieu of deep worldview pluralism, it is only a beginning. Moreover, even a sound, systematic Thomistic defense of the relative self-sufficiency of practical reason for knowing and living out the natural law can be misleading if it neglects to include a discussion of these four realities: 1) the mutually dependent relation of speculative and practical reason; 2) the subjectivity-shaping role of social practices; 3) the tradition-constituted-and-constitutive character of practical rationality; and 4) the indispensability of divine revelation in ethical inquiry and practice.
These essays are good introductions to the New Natural Law Theory. For more about this branch of jurisprudence, see the following web-based essays and articles (some of them approving of natural law and some of them critical):
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. “On the New Natural Law Theory.” Modern Age (2000: 415-418).
Phillip E. Johnson. “In Defense of Natural Law.” First Things (1999).
Christopher Tollefsen. “The New Natural Law Theory.” LYCEUM, Vol. X, No. 1 (2008).
David Gordon’s review of Robert P. George’s In Defense of Natural Law. Review title: “New But Not Improved.” The Mises Review. Vol. 5, No. 4 (1999).
Larry Arnhart. “Darwinian Conservatism as the New Natural Law.” The Good Society, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2003).
The Daily Dish. “The ‘New’ Natural Law.” The Atlantic (Dec. 23, 2009).
David D. Kirkpatrick. “The Conservative-Christian Big Thinker.” The New York Times Magazine (Dec. 16, 2009).
“The Gospel of Life: A Symposium.” First Things (1995).
This list is hardly exhaustive. It shows only a few scholarly and popular pieces. No discussion of natural law theory should fail to mention John Finnis and Robert P. George, whose books and articles are well-known and oft-discussed. Anamnesis, edited by Peter Haworth, is sure to come out with more compelling pieces related to topics discussed here at The Literary Lawyer. Please read Anamnesis and, if you feel so inclined, leave a comment in the “comments” section of the web-based fora.
Anarchism, Austrian Economics, Conservatism, Definition, free market, Ideology, international law, legal polycentrism, Libertarianism, Literary Criticism, literary theory, Marxism, Neoconservativism, pluralism, Pragmatism, Transnational Law
In Arts & Letters, Austrian Economics, Conservatism, Humane Economy, Jurisprudence, Law, Law-and-Literature, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Literary Theory & Criticism, Politics, Pragmatism, Transnational Law on August 3, 2011 at 11:18 am
A few months ago, the Libertarian Alliance, a London-based think tank, published my paper on transnational law. Below is an excerpt from that paper. The piece is available for download through SSRN by clicking here, or on the website of the Libertarian Alliance by clicking here.
In 1957, reviewing Philip Jessup’s Transnational Law, James N. Hyde wrote that “[t]ransnational law is not likely to become a term of art for a new body of law.”25 Mr. Hyde was wrong. There has been a proliferation of relatively new law journals bearing “transnational law” in their titles: Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems: A Journal of the University of Iowa College of Law, Ashburn Institute Transnational Law Journal, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Transnational Law Review, and Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. There are LLM programs in transnational law (such as the one I am in), and there are even institutes and think-tanks devoted to the study and development of transnational law. Transnational law has in fact become the term of art for a new body of law, and here we will consider the nature and meaning of this term as well as the corpus of law it has created. It is perhaps not coincidental that the emergence of transnational law coincided with transnational poetics26 and other transnational trends in literary criticism because the legal and literary fields always seem responsive to one another.
One of the earliest references, if not the earliest reference, to the concept of transnationalism comes from the pragmatist philosopher and student of John Dewey: Randolph Bourne. Bourne’s use of the term “transnational” recalls William James’s notion of religious pluralism as non-absolute and non-monist.27 Bourne appears to have revised and extended James’s pragmatism to fit the political instead of the religious or philosophical context, although James himself came close to addressing the former context in “A Pluralistic Universe.” Bourne’s essay “Trans-National America” regarded transnationalism as a cousin of cultural pluralism, the notion that differences in belief across cultures and communities may not be equally valid but can be at least equally practical. Against essentialism, monism, and absolutism, Bourne posits a consequentialist system of polycentrism that regards multiplicity as positive and collectivism as dangerous. Society can and should be multiple and heterogeneous, not single and homogeneous, for a one-size-fits-all polis can only materialize through the stamping out of minority views and through the erasing of distinct, regional cultures. Put another way, Bourne transforms James’s varieties of religious experience28 into varieties of political experience.
Kenneth Burke, a literary critic, sometime student of pragmatism, and Marxist converted into a non-“ism” altogether, argued later in his life that ideology and fanaticism – by which he meant “the effort to impose one doctrine of motives abruptly upon a world composed of many different motivational situations”29 – were destructive missions incompatible with pluralism or democracy. Burke, who remained naively critical of the free market, nevertheless refused ideologies as simplifying what cannot be simplified: human behavior. What Burke did not realize is that free market theories, especially those of the Austrian variety, are not deterministic: they refuse to pigeonhole people or to reduce them to economic calculations; they treat humans as unpredictable and spontaneous and celebrate the sheer variety of human behavior. My point in referencing Burke is not to systematically demolish his economic preferences but to suggest that his wide-ranging theories have positive implications for our understanding of transnationalism. One could argue that Bourne and Burke were the earliest expositors of transnationalist theories tied to the practical world and that Jessup and others merely repackaged Bourne and Burke’s dicta. Regardless of whether Jessup either read or credited Bourne and Burke, the theories emanating from these two literary critics would have been in circulation at Jessup’s moment in history. Jessup, widely read as he was, probably would have encountered Bourne and Burke’s transnationalism directly or indirectly. Read the rest of this entry »
Law School, Leaders in Legal Education, Legal Education, Pedagogy
In Law, Legal Education & Pedagogy, Legal Research & Writing, Pedagogy, Teaching on August 2, 2011 at 11:46 am
A loyal reader of this site has suggested that I post a link to this article about 10 leaders in legal education. I’m happy to do so. I’m curious what other readers think of the list.
Although I’ve posted the list below, I encourage readers to click on the link above to see why these leaders were chosen.
1. Massachusetts School of Law, Andover
2. Richard Matasar
3. Elizabeth Mertz
4. Association of American Law Schools
5. Barbara Boxer
6. David Lat
7. George Leef
8. Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier
9. Bryan Garner
10. Stephen R. Marsh
Academic Questions, Adam Smith, Albert Venn Dicey, Alliance Defense Fund, Aquinas, Baudrillard, Blackstone, C.S. Peirce, Camille Paglia, Carl Schmitt, Carol Iannone, Charles E. Rounds, Chaucer, Chief Justice John Roberts, Daniel J. Kornstein, David F. Forte, David French, Derrida, Emerson, Eve Sedgwick, Foucault, Freud, George W. Dent, Grotius, Hayek, Hobbes, Hudson Institute, James Kent, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, John Dewey, Jr., Judith Butler, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Kafka, Kant, Law School, Legal Education, Lino A. Graglia, Locke, Louis Menand, Machiavelli, Marx, Mel Bradford, Michael I. Krauss, Milton, National Association of Scholars, Nietzsche, originalism, Richard Hooker, Richard Weaver, Robert H. Bork, Shakespeare, Stanley Fish, William James
In Arts & Letters, Humanities, Law, Legal Education & Pedagogy, Pedagogy, Teaching, Writing on July 27, 2011 at 2:23 pm
The latest issue of Academic Questions (Summer 2011: Vol. 24, No. 2) devotes most of its content to legal education. Published by the National Association of Scholars, Academic Questions often features theme issues and invites scholars from across the disciplines to comment on particular concerns about the professoriate. (Full disclosure: I am a member of the NAS.) Carol Iannone, editor at large, titles her introduction to the issue “Law School and Other Tyrannies,” and writes that “[w]hat is happening in the law schools has everything to do with the damage and depredation that we see in the legal system at large.” She adds that the contributors to this issue “may not agree on all particulars, but they tell us that all is not well, that law school education is outrageously expensive, heavily politicized, and utterly saturated with ‘diversity’ mania.” What’s more, Iannone submits, law school “fails to provide any grounding in sound legal doctrine, or any moral or ethical basis from which to understand principles of law in debate today.” These are strong words. But are they accurate? I would say yes and no.
Law school education is too expensive, but its costs seem to have risen alongside the costs of university education in general. Whether any university or postgraduate education should cost what it costs today is another matter altogether.
There is little doubt that law schools are “heavily politicized,” as even a cursory glance at the articles in “specialized” law journals would suggest. These journals address anything from gender and race to transnational law and human rights.
But how can law be taught without politicizing? Unlike literature, which does not always immediately implicate politics, law bears a direct relation to politics, or at least to political choices. The problem is not the political topics of legal scholarship and pedagogy so much as it is the lack of sophistication with which these topics are addressed. The problem is that many law professors lack a broad historical perspective and are unable to contextualize their interests within the wider university curriculum or against the subtle trends of intellectual history.
In law journals devoted to gender and feminism, or law journals considered left-wing, you will rarely find articles written by individuals with the intelligence or learning of Judith Butler, Camille Paglia, or Eve Sedgwick. Say what you will about them, these figures are well-read and historically informed. Their writings and theories go far beyond infantile movement politics and everyday partisan advocacy. Read the rest of this entry »
A Plea for Positivism, Bradley C. S. Watson, Claremont Review of Books, Conservatism, Constitution, Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths: The Touchstone of the Natural Law, Edwin Meese, Fred Hutchison, Hadley Arkes, III, jurisprudence, law, Michael M. Uhlmann, Murray Rothbard, Natural Law, Natural Law Man, positive law, Robert P George, The Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism
In American History, Arts & Letters, Conservatism, History, Humanities, Jurisprudence, Law, Legal Education & Pedagogy, News and Current Events, Politics on July 14, 2011 at 5:30 pm
Three days ago, the Claremont Review of Books posted two interesting reviews on jurisprudence. The first, “Natural Law Man,” is a reprint of a piece that appeared in the Winter/Spring 2010-11 issue. Here, Michael M. Uhlmann praises Hadley Arkes’s Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths: The Touchstone of the Natural Law. In the second review, “A Plea for Positivism,” Bradley C. S. Watson comments on Gary L. McDowell’s The Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism. (Click here to read McDowell’s discussion of the book with Edwin Meese, III.) Both reviews situate their subjects alongside conservative theory. Both books are worth reading.
The prevailing tendency among some uncritical commentators is to binarize natural law theory and positive law theory as polar opposites. That’s understandable if the terms “natural law” and “positive law” are reduced to cliché. But cliché, although helpful to students first getting introduced to concepts, doesn’t do justice to the complexities and challenges of natural law or positive law jurisprudence. In any event, it is curious that both natural law theorists and positive law theorists claim to have influenced, and to have been influenced by, conservatism. That fact alone suggests that natural law theory and positive law theory are complicated. Here are some readings that will complicate the complicated: Murray Rothbard’s excerpts “Introduction to Natural Law” and “Natural Law versus Positive Law,” F. Russell Hittinger’s short pieces “Natural Law” and “The Rule of Law and Law of Nature,” Robert P. George’s “Witherspoon Lecture,” and Fred Hutchison’s overview “Natural Law and Conservatism.”
Aristotle, Auburn University, Bioethics, Brookings Institution, Children, Cloning, Composition, English Departments, Eric Cohen, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Forensic Discourse, Health & Medicine, Hoover Institution, James Madison Program in American Ideals & Institutions, law, Malpractice, Organ Transplants, Pedagogy, Physician Assisted Suicide, Princeton University, Problems and Possibilities of Modern Genetics, Robert P George, Surrogacy, Teaching, The Constitution, The New Atlantis, Writing
In Advocacy, Arts & Letters, Bioethics, Communication, Creative Writing, Creativity, Humanities, Jurisprudence, Law, Law-and-Literature, Legal Education & Pedagogy, News and Current Events, Pedagogy, Politics, Rhetoric, Rhetoric & Communication, Teaching, Writing on July 6, 2011 at 8:33 pm
Last fall, I was assigned to teach a course called “Health & Medicine.” Because I know little about health or medicine, I was concerned. The subject of the course was writing, so I decided to craft a syllabus to facilitate classroom discussion and textual argument. Here is the course description as stated on my syllabus:
Forensic discourse is one of three forms of classical rhetoric as defined by Aristotle. It focuses on the relationship between language and law. This semester we will explore forensic discourse in the context of health and medicine and consider the relationship of law to such issues as physician assisted suicide, surrogacy, cloning, informed consent, malpractice, and organ transplants. Readings on ethics and philosophy will inform the way you think about these issues.
Your grade will not depend on how much you learn about law, but on how you use language to argue about and with law. Because the facts of any case are rarely clear-cut, you will need to understand both sides of every argument. Your writing assignments will require you to argue on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendants (or prosecutors and defendants) and to rebut the arguments of opposing counsel. You will develop different tactics for persuading your audience (judges, attorneys, etc.), and you will become skilled in the art of influence.
During the semester, your class will interview one attorney, one judge, and one justice sitting on the Supreme Court of Alabama.
My students came from mostly nursing and pre-medical backgrounds. A few were science majors of some kind, and at least two were engineering majors.
The students were also at varying stages in their academic progress: some were freshmen, some were sophomores, two were juniors, and at least one was a senior. Throughout the semester, I was impressed by students’ ability to extract important issues from dense legal readings and articulate complicated reasoning in nuanced and intelligent ways.
I thought about this “Health & Medicine” class this week when I came across this article published by the Brookings Institution. The title of the article is “The Problems and Possibilities of Modern Genetics: A Paradigm for Social, Ethical, and Political Analysis.” The authors are Eric Cohen and Robert P. George. Cohen is editor of The New Atlantis and an adjunct fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. George is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, the director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals & Institutions, and a fellow at the Hoover Institution. Read the rest of this entry »
Caribbean, Colony, Early American Literature, Legal Discourse, Nicole N. Aljoe, Project Muse, Rule of Law, slave narratives, Slavery, Slavery and the Law, Testimony, University of North Carolina Press, West Indian Slave Narratives
In Advocacy, American History, Arts & Letters, Civil Procedure, History, Humanities, Jurisprudence, Law, Law-and-Literature, Laws of Slavery, Literary Theory & Criticism, Nineteenth-Century America, Politics, Rhetoric, Slavery, The West Indies on July 5, 2011 at 7:21 pm
Nicole N. Aljoe has published an intriguing article in Volume 46 (issue no. 2) of Early American Literature (2011), which is published by the University of North Carolina Press. The article is titled “‘Going to Law’: Legal Discourse and Testimony in Early West Indian Slave Narratives.” It is available here on Project Muse. The abstract is below:
Despite the fact that the courts had not proven consistently helpful in their quests for freedom, British West Indian slaves frequently consulted them in order to invoke the rule of law and pursue their rights. Several Caribbean historians have documented the ways in which slaves in the West Indies participated in formal legal arenas almost from the initial days of colonization and claimed the courts as one of their own forums for resolving disputes and asserting those few rights written into the various parliamentary acts intended to ameliorate the conditions of the enslaved and passed in England and its Caribbean colonies from 1788 onward. Indeed, slaves in the West Indies participated in the courts systems as plaintiffs as well as defendants more frequently than previously thought. And although the courts were certainly used by those in power to oppress slaves, women, children, and the poor, as well as to “legitimate [the] blatantly repressive regime” of slavery, they nevertheless provided a forum for those who did not write the laws in question to use the courts to ensure the legal protection of their “natural rights” (Lazarus-Black, “John Grant’s” 154). Thus, in another of the seemingly endless paradoxes inherent to the British imperial slave system, slaves—objects of property, yet human subjects—could, in certain situations, use the courts in the West Indies and in England on their own behalf, as legal agents to affirm their status as legal subjects deserving of the law’s unbiased protection, and judgment.
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